Canada Got the Structure Right. Now It Needs to Move Faster

What Canada Got Right on Defence — and Where It Still Lags

Canadian Armed Forces recruitment just hit its highest level in more than 30 years. The CAF went in aiming to bring in around 7,000 people. It ended up recruiting 7,310 new Regular Force members.

That did not happen by accident.

Canada rolled out a major compensation upgrade in 2025. Starting pay for Regular Force recruits rose by 20 percent. At the same time, some of the bureaucratic drag was stripped out of the system. Processing moved faster. Recruits were allowed to begin while paperwork continued in the background. A new online portal came online. Security clearances were streamlined. None of these changes, taken alone, explains the result. Together, they did.

The moment demanded adjustment. Canada adjusted. The result was real.

So let us take a different approach today. Instead of stopping at the headline, let us look at what Canada is getting right on defense, where the weak spots still are, and the one unnecessary mistake that is beginning to chip away at the New Canada brand.

What did Canada get right?

One of the clearest things Canada has gotten right is that its Army is no longer pretending the old structure fits the world that is coming. The reorganization now underway is a serious step.

The existing four-division model is being dismantled and replaced with a cleaner split between homeland defence, warfighting, and support. That is a better design. It gives Canada a force built to defend its own territory, respond to emergencies, strengthen the Arctic presence, protect critical infrastructure, and generate reserves, while also maintaining a separate high-readiness formation built to fight forward with allies when needed.

That separation creates real strategic value. In a country as large as Canada, homeland defence cannot depend on a force concentrated in a few major centres. A structure built for wider national presence gives the Army better local knowledge, faster response capacity, and a more resilient footprint.

Just as important, the model is scalable.

Canada does not need to build the full end state on day one. It can put the framework in place, expand it over time, and layer in capabilities as manpower, procurement, and organization catch up. That is how you move toward centralized command, decentralized execution, without waiting for perfect conditions.

Next up is the alliance architecture.

Canada joined the European SAFE program, which is designed to expand and streamline defence production across Europe and participating partners, including Canada. That is a smart move. It pushes the system toward a more integrated production base, where allied states are not trapped inside narrow national silos.

A shell can be built in Poland, paired with a howitzer built in France, and used by Canadian forces. The more interoperable the network becomes, the harder it gets to isolate and pressure any single state, because the wider allied industrial base can rally behind the one under strain.

Canada’s decision to join SAFE was an excellent one. It opens the door to broader procurement options, deeper industrial integration, and a more resilient supply structure across the alliance.

Then Canada went a step further and tightened its defence cooperation with the Nordic states. That also makes sense. The Nordics are not just politically aligned with Canada. They sit in the same emerging strategic geography: Arctic security.

In March, Canada and the Nordic countries agreed to deepen cooperation on defence, security, resilience, and industrial capacity, including ramping up defence production and developing interoperable and dual-use technologies.

Another thing Canada got right was moving first on the proposed Defence, Security and Resilience Bank. Mark Carney did not wait for a perfect coalition to form. He made clear Canada was ready to lead, host the institution, and push the project forward. That was the correct instinct.

Expanding defence production across the democratic coalition will require far more than annual budget cycles and fragmented national efforts. It will require long-term capital, institutional backing, and a structure capable of pulling private financing into strategic industrial buildout.

That is what a serious multilateral bank can help do. The point is not to replace government spending, but to stretch it, de-risk major projects, and give defence industry a longer runway to build capacity, supply chains, and resilience. Some allies appear hesitant, especially those already trying to rearm through national channels.

But Canada’s decision to move anyway was the stronger call.

Where does Canada need to improve?

Most of what Canada has done so far has been structural. That is useful, but procurement has still not started at the pace it could have. No, Ottawa does not need to begin throwing around billion-dollar orders across every category at once. Some of the bigger files, like fighter jets and submarines, are expensive, strategic decisions naturally move more slowly. To a point, that can be accepted.

But there are other areas where the delay is starting to look unnecessary.

The clearest example is the drone layer. Canada’s relationship with both Ukraine and Europe has been strong since the Carney government took office. This is not a closed door. If the Prime Minister makes two calls — one to his defence minister and one to President Zelensky — things can start moving quickly.

Better yet, Canada should not limit itself to buying drones off the shelf. It should move into joint research and development with Ukraine.

Arctic conditions create a different operating environment, which means Canada has its own adaptation needs. That is exactly why co-development makes more sense than passive procurement. Ukraine brings the wartime knowledge, Canada brings a different theatre, industrial capacity, and a market opportunity. If Ottawa moves early, it can strengthen its own defence while helping build something exportable with real demand behind it.

Where does Canada need course correction?

Canada has been stalling on the Saab file for far too long. Saab’s request to Canada is now more than five years old. The least Ottawa could have done by now is place some orders with Saab.

If the fighter jet decision is going to take time because of the NORAD dynamic with the United States, then Canada can still buy itself some room by ordering Saab GlobalEye early warning aircraft. These aircraft cost roughly $650–670 million each in a packaged deal. Canada does not have this type of aircraft in its fleet. Even Australia has six. Without AWACS, you will not stand much chance in a drone and missile war. Canada is going to have to order this capability at some point anyway, so there is no reason to keep sitting still.

Two GlobalEyes would do more than fill a gap. They would buy Canada time on the Gripen decision and give Saab a reason to wait a little longer while Ottawa works through the fighter question.

Right now, the delay is beginning to look indecisive.

That is a problem because Canada is steadily building respect abroad for how it is handling alliances and defence relationships. Countries are taking note. This Saab hesitation does not fit that picture.

It feels out of sync with the sharper Canadian brand now taking shape.

Your support for Concis Canada is critical in moments like this. It allows us to dig deeper, investigate harder, and keep Canadians informed about the decisions shaping their future. It will help us reach more people across the country and show the world the role Canada plays within the democratic alliance.